The claim
Xint’s write-up, NGINX2Root, reports five nginx CVEs, each an independent path to remote code execution under specific configurations (Xint, vendor). The lead flaw, CVE-2026-123007, is an unauthenticated HTTP/2 flow-control bug in every official release from 1.9.5 through 1.31.8 when HTTP/2 is on (CIRCL, independent; Qualys, independent).
The headline is the second half. Xint chained the nginx foothold with a use-after-free in the Linux kernel’s SCTP code, introduced in Linux 4.15, which has no CVE and no patch as of 18 November. In its tests the chain also escaped a Docker container to root on the host (Xint, vendor; also reported by CIRCL, independent).
Five doors, one ladder
Each nginx flaw needs its own configuration, so exposure differs by server block.
| CVE | Needs | First affected | HTTP/2 off blocks it? |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-123007 | HTTP/2 enabled | 1.9.5 | Yes |
| CVE-2026-123634 | resolver, a request-derived proxy_pass, and subrequests such as mirror | 1.13.4 | No |
| CVE-2026-123633 | HTTP/2 with proxied requests | 1.19.7 | Yes |
| CVE-2026-121810 | HTTP/3 with proxied requests | 1.25.0 | No |
| CVE-2026-113425 | Mail proxy with proxy on and auth_http | 0.5.15 | No |
Source for the table: CIRCL TR-105 (independent), matching Xint (vendor). Turning HTTP/2 off closes two of the five. CIRCL’s words: “Merely disabling HTTP/2 is not a complete NGINX2ROOT mitigation.”
Fixed builds: open source 1.31.9 (mainline) and 1.30.7 (stable); NGINX Plus 37.3.0.1 and 37.0.8.1. Qualys reports that F5 released them on 18 November and rates the lead flaw 9.2 under CVSS v4.0 and 8.1 under v3.1 (Qualys, independent). Xint and CIRCL had 1.31.9 scheduled for 19 November.
The test: does a patched nginx mean a safe host?
No. The nginx patch removes these five entry points. The kernel step does not depend on nginx at all. CIRCL notes that host root needs “a reachable vulnerable SCTP path or another escalation mechanism” (CIRCL, independent). Any other code running on that kernel, through a different bug or a compromised dependency, meets the same unpatched step. Until a kernel fix ships, the control is to stop SCTP loading where nothing needs it.
Then the patch itself has three ways to miss:
- Reload is not restart. A reload applies configuration but keeps the old program running, so the flaw stays in memory until a full restart or a supported live binary upgrade (Qualys; Xint).
- The version string lies. Distro backports fix code without changing
nginx -v. Ubuntu 22.04 still reports 1.18.0 after security updates (Xint). As of 18 November, Ubuntu and Debian had not shipped fixed packages (Qualys). - The image brings it back. Container images, Helm charts, and autoscaling templates pin a build. F5’s NGINX Ingress Controller 5.8.0 and NGINX Gateway Fabric 2.9.0 move to 1.31.9. Community ingress-nginx was archived in March 2026 and will ship no further security fixes (Qualys).
Can you find your exposure by scanning banners? Barely. Xint counted 56.7 million nginx hosts on Shodan on 10 November; 11.94 million reported a version, which is 21.1% (our maths, matching Xint). Of those, 98.9% sat in the vulnerable range, about 11.81 million hosts (our maths). Caveats: a version in range does not mean HTTP/2 is on, backports keep old strings, and roughly 79% of hosts hide their version. Inventory from the inside, not from a scanner.
Where this breaks
- F5’s advisories were not read directly. The NGINX Plus builds and the CVSS scores come from Qualys’s citation of F5 (K000163926). CIRCL cites a different F5 article, K000164058.
- The kernel flaw is withheld. Xint is holding the SCTP details until a kernel patch exists, so its full scope is unverified.
- No exploitation confirmed yet. As of 18 November there was no public confirmation of exploitation in the wild, but working exploit code for the lead flaw is public (Qualys). Treat the window as short.
- The SCTP block has limits.
install sctp /bin/falsein/etc/modprobe.d/stops loading through modprobe only. It does not unload a module already loaded or disable SCTP built into the kernel, and a container uses its host’s kernel (CIRCL). - We have not tested any of this. Nothing here is measured by Prestanda.
Five steps this week
- Step 1. Inventory every nginx you run. Edge, reverse proxies, containers, Kubernetes ingress, and vendor appliances that embed it, with the package version and which of the five configurations each uses. Owner: platform engineering lead.
- Step 2. Patch and restart, then prove it. 1.31.9, 1.30.7, NGINX Plus 37.3.0.1 or 37.0.8.1, or a distro package checked against its advisory. Restart, do not reload, and confirm the running binary’s start time is after the update. Owner: infrastructure operations.
- Step 3. Rebuild what pins the old build. Images, Helm charts, and launch templates. Replace community ingress-nginx with a maintained controller. Owner: platform engineering lead.
- Step 4. Block SCTP where nothing needs it. Add the modprobe rule, then check whether the module is already loaded or built in, on every host kernel under your containers. Owner: Linux platform owner.
- Step 5. Mitigate until patched. Turn HTTP/2 off where clients allow (check gRPC), disable HTTP/3 listeners, use fixed upstreams, and restrict the mail proxy. Watch for the kernel patch. Owner: security engineering.
The kernel fix is the distribution’s job. Knowing which of your hosts still load SCTP is ours.
Missing
- F5’s advisories read first-hand, and which F5 article is canonical.
- A CVE, scope, and patch for the kernel SCTP flaw.
- Fixed Ubuntu and Debian packages, last checked 18 November.
- Any confirmed exploitation in the wild.
- A Prestanda test of the patch or the SCTP block.
Frequently asked questions
What is NGINX2Root?
NGINX2Root is Xint's name for five nginx vulnerabilities, each a separate path to remote code execution under specific configurations, led by CVE-2026-123007 in HTTP/2 flow control. Xint chained them with an unpatched Linux kernel SCTP flaw to reach root on the host, including from inside a Docker container.
Is updating nginx to 1.31.9 or 1.30.7 enough?
It closes the five nginx flaws, but only after a full restart, since a reload keeps the old binary running. It does not fix the kernel SCTP flaw, which has no CVE or patch yet. Block the SCTP module on hosts that do not need it, and rebuild images and charts that pin an older nginx.
Does turning off HTTP/2 protect us?
Partly. Disabling HTTP/2 blocks CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633. The other three need separate mitigations: fixed upstreams instead of request-time DNS, HTTP/3 listeners off, and the mail proxy restricted or off. CIRCL says disabling HTTP/2 alone is not a complete mitigation.
Living page. Last updated 19 Nov 2026. We update this note when the kernel SCTP fix ships, when Ubuntu and Debian publish fixed packages, or if exploitation is confirmed. Want a second pair of eyes on your patch verification? Talk to us.